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BEING UIGHUR . . . WITH “CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS”:
ANALYZING CHINA’S LEGAL CRUSADE AGAINST
UIGHUR IDENTITY
Brennan Davis*
The Uighur peasants are very eager to take the road of cooperation. . . . Some people claim[ed] that co-operation cannot
succeed among the minority nationalities. This is not so.
— Mao Zedong1
Introduction (United Nations)
In 2016, the Permanent Delegation of the People’s Republic of China to
the United Nations celebrated the ten-year anniversary of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).2 The
Declaration passed with overwhelming support in the General Assembly,
and the People’s Republic joined 143 other states that voted in favor of the
Declaration.3 Only four states voted against the resolution: Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.4 (All four of these states have
since reversed their stances and have offered support of the Declaration.5)
In commemorating the passing of the Declaration, Counsellor Yao stated
“[n]ot all countries have indigenous peoples” and drew a distinction
between “indigenous peoples [and] native people.”6 For indigenous peoples

* Brennan Davis is a third-year law student at the University of Oklahoma College of
Law, in 2016 he studied Chinese language and government at Peking University in Beijing.
He has two bachelor’s degrees—one in International Relations with an emphasis on East
Asia and the second in East Asian History. He also possesses a minor in Mandarin Chinese.
1. Mao Zedong, Editor’s Notes to Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside, in 5
SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 242, 247 (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1977).
2. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted
by the General Assembly in 2007. See G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
3. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS:
DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/
declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Statement by Counsellor Yao Shaojun of the Chinese Delegation at the 15th Session
of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE’S
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to exist, as opposed to native peoples, Yao contended, there must be “a
legacy [of a] colonial past.”7 As a result, he concluded, “China has no
indigenous people.”8 Yao’s position reveals the inherent weaknesses of the
Declaration—the ambiguity of the text. While the Declaration frequently
invokes the term “indigenous peoples,” it at no point defines what
communities the term is intended to apply to.9 It is in China’s interest to
assert an intimate and intrinsic link between colonialism and indigenous
peoples because China is not considered to have a colonial past.10 This
definition, then, allows the Chinese to criticize countries with colonial
legacies, most importantly the United States, for failing to treat native
communities with the dignity they are owed while simultaneously being
immune to such criticisms. This definition, which benefits China, seems to
be accepted broadly as all the states that refused to approve the Declaration
at the time of its adoption (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States) share a colonial past. This suggests that these countries feared the
Declaration would open them to unique attacks on the world stage and
indicates that these states accept a definition of indigenous people similar to
the one proposed by Counsellor Yao.11 In some cases, the dissenting votes
were explicit in their feeling that the Declaration afforded rights too
substantial to indigenous people within their borders, with New Zealand
expressly stating that the Declaration was “fundamentally incompatible
with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal arrangements . . . and the
principle of governing for the good of all our citizens.”12 This suggests that
REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UN (May 10, 2016), http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/
t1363984.htm.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 2.
10. See Colonialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (rev. Aug. 29, 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism/ (“[C]olonialism [is used] to describe the
process of European settlement and political control over the rest of the world, including the
Americas, Australia, and parts of Africa and Asia. . . . The term colonialism is frequently
used to describe the settlement of North America, Australia, New Zealand, Algeria, and
Brazil, places that were controlled by a large population of permanent European residents.”).
11. Id.
12. Naomi Solomon, Was the New Zealand Government Justified in Voting Against the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?, 0 TE KĀHUI KURA MĀORI, no. 1, n.d.,
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-Bid001Kahu-t1-g1-t4.html (quoting Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Explanation of Vote by HE Rosemary Banks, New
Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.
& TRADE (Sept. 13, 2007), https://web.archive.org/web/20090506090838/https://www.mfat.
govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2007/0-13-September-2007.php0).
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in the absence of a clear definition, the colonial-centric definition, which is
advantageous for China, has carried the day and allowed the People’s
Republic to assert that they do not have indigenous people; therefore, China
is not bound by the Declaration’s principals. As a result, China can happily
endorse the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples while
simultaneously asserting that it is inapplicable to their own “native
peoples,” of which there are many.
Ethnic Diversity in China
The People’s Republic of China is an incredibly diverse nation with
fifty-six recognized minzu.13 These groups range from the widely known to
the obscure, and the eleven historically recognized minority groups include
“the Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, Uyghur, Miao, Yao, Yi, Korean, Manchu, Li,
and Gaoshan (in Taiwan).”14 Despite this diversity, the Han ethnic group,
who comprise over 90% of the country’s population, is the community
Americans are most likely to envision as a “Chinese person.”15 Despite
their superior numbers, the Han do not have a monopoly on meaningful
historical and cultural contributions to the various Chinese states. In fact,
many of the most memorable “Chinese” Dynasties have been founded, led,
and ruled by non-Han people, including the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–
1369) and the Manchu Great Qing Dynasty (1636–1912).16 However, the
understanding of these nationalities has evolved over time and has
accelerated during the modern era, featuring the end of the Great Qing, the
Republican, and the Communist Periods. The Great Qing Dynasty saw the
Chinese state expand to unprecedented levels and incorporated all of
modern-day China, as well as areas which today belong to North Korea,
Russia, and Vietnam, along with Mongolia and Taiwan in their entirety.17
13. Minzu, 民族, is a combination of the words for “people” with the word “zu,” which
refers to a group of people or things with shared features.
14. Wang Linzhu, The Identification of Minorities in China, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y
J., no. 2, 2015, at 1, 9; see id. at 9 n.37 (“‘Generally accepted minorities’ were groups that
had been repeatedly mentioned in the Chinese Classic literatures or recorded during the
Republican period. They were simply considered to ‘exist’ . . . .”)
15. THOMAS S. MULLANEY, COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NATION: ETHNIC
CLASSIFICATION IN MODERN CHINA 1 (2011).
16. See John W. Dardess, From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty: Changing Forms of
Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia, 30 MONUMENTA SERICA 117 (1972–1973)
(discussing the formation of the Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty); PAMELA K. CROSSLEY, THE
MANCHUS 8 (1997) (discussing the Manchus and their eventual conquest of and rule over
China).
17. See Qing Dynasty, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
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During this dynasty, which was governed by the foreign Manchu people,
the government viewed China as a coalition of the Manchu—the
leadership—and the Han—the manpower—who, together, ruled over
several hundred distinct “barbarian” groups roaming the distant provinces.18
This understanding shifted dramatically following the end of the Great
Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China. The Great
Qing collapsed in 1919, in part, because the Han were unwilling to continue
being subjugated by the Manchu.19 Rather than go on accepting Manchu
dominance, especially given the extensive defeats the Great Qing had
suffered at the hands of Western governments, the Han rose up under the
direction of Sun Yat-sen, the first President of China.20 Sun Yat-sen, after
overthrowing the Great Qing, instituted a republican government that was
built on his Three Principles—Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood.21
President Sun’s first pillar of Nationalism was ethnic-nationalism and not
patriotic-nationalism.22 He stated that “[d]uring the periods when [the
Han’s] political and military prowess declined, they could not escape . . .
from the fate of a conquered nation, but they could eventually vigorously
reassert themselves.”23 Further, Sun declared his revolution against the

Qing-dynasty#ref331832 (last updated Oct. 11, 2019).
18. MULLANEY, supra note 15, at 1–2 (“Yunnan [was said to be] home to over one
hundred distinct peoples, with nearly one hundred more in the neighboring province of
Guizhou.”).
19. See John Stuart Thomson, The Genesis of the Republican Revolution in China from
a South China Standpoint, 3 J. RACE DEV. 316, 320 (1913).
20. See id. at 320-21. Sun Yat-sen is an impressively popular figure in China and on
both sides of the Taiwanese Straits. Both the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist
Party claim his legacy and both honor and acknowledge him to be the First President of
China. See Agence France-Presse, Tug of War over China’s Founding Father Sun Yat-sen as
Communist Party Celebrates His Legacy, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2044782/tug-war-over-chinasfounding-father-sun-yat-sen.
21. Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (1923), in 2 SOURCES OF
WORLD HISTORY 281, 282-83 (Mark A. Kishlansky ed., 1995).
22. There are two forms of nationalism recognized in history, here I refer to them as
patriotic-nationalism and ethnic-nationalism. Both are ways of approaching the concept of a
national identity. Patriotic-nationalism presumes all people within the political confines of a
country are members of the national identity, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or religious
origins. Ethnic-nationalism, however, is more limited. Ethnic-nationalists believe that the
national identity is built on shared language, shared culture, and shared religion. These
things, in harmony, form an ethnicity. See Jerry Z. Muller, Us and Them: The Enduring
Power of Ethnic Nationalism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 18, 20.
23. Id. at 282.
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Manchu Great Qing Dynasty as a repetition of the earlier Han revolution
against the Mongol Yuan Dynasty.24
Despite the Manchu’s impressive nearly three-hundred-year reign over
China, Sun was sincere in calling for reconciliation without doubting the
righteousness of the revolution he had led. He stated that “[n]o vengeance
has been inflicted on the Manchus and we have endeavored to live side by
side with them on an equal footing. This is our nationalistic policy toward
races within our national boundaries.”25 Despite Sun’s inclusive language,
his ultimate message is clear—the Han have the right to rule China,
including the areas populated by minorities. However, they ought not
oppress the minorities living within China’s borders, for when minority
groups gained the reins of government, it was only a matter of time before
the yoke of minority governance over Han would be thrown off.26 Sun’s
Nationalist Party, under the subsequent leadership of Jiang Jieshi, also
insisted that there were not hundreds or even dozens of unique ethnic
groups, and instead that “the country was home to only one people, ‘the
Chinese people,’ and that the supposedly distinct groups of the republic
were merely subvarieties of a common stock.”27 The Nationalist Party
referred to this single ethnic group as zhonghua minzu, using the
aforementioned minzu combined with zhonghua to mean China.28 This
ideology was mirrored by the first flag of the Republic of China which was
composed of five colored horizontal bars with one color representing one of
the five recognized ethnic subvarieties—Han, Manchu, Mongol, Uighur,29
and Tibetan.30 While it may seem contradictory to allege that there are not
true distinctions between the Republic’s citizens and subsequently adopt a
flag featuring those false distinctions, the Nationalists would contend that it
was not the five colored bars that were of significance, but rather that they
came together to form one flag—the Chinese flag.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. MULLANEY, supra note 15, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Technically, the Hui were represented. The Hui are a minority group in China who
are predominately Muslim. However, “Hui” (回) at the time referred generally to Muslim
people and, when the flag was created, referred to the Muslims in Western China, today the
group we identify as Uighurs. It was not until later that Hui took on its modern meaning as
referring to a specific ethnic group we now call the Hui, who are distinct from the Uighurs.
See SUISHENG ZHAO, A NATION-STATE BY CONSTRUCTION: DYNAMICS OF MODERN CHINESE
NATIONALISM 171 (2004).
30. Id.
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The approach toward identifying and incorporating minorities shifted
again following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese
Civil War. Initially, the newly established People’s Republic of China
resolved to identify ethnic groups on the basis of self-identification.31 After
all, the People’s Republic envisioned not a single unified Chinese race with
various subdivisions, but rather, the notion of a multicultural, multinational
union held together by its sincere belief in socialist principles.32 This
proved to be overly idealistic and “[i]n the 1953 national census, over 400
self-reported [ethnic] groups were recorded.”33 This was problematic not
only because it was a towering figure which could not be easily reduced to
autonomous provinces—similar to the Soviet model—but also because the
Communist Party had reserved only 150 parliamentary seats for minority
representatives.34 Such a number was intended to be “more than twice the
number to which [ethnic minorities] would be entitled on a proportional
basis.”35
To resolve this discrepancy, the Communist Party assembled hundreds of
ethnologists, linguists, historians, sociologists, and archaeologists to
identify every minority group in the People’s Republic.36 This project later
became known as the Ethnic Identification Project, which featured sending
the assembled experts out into the countryside and having them identify
minority groups, defined as “a historically constituted, stable community of
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life,
and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”37 This
definition was originally offered by Joseph Stalin and later adopted by the
People’s Republic.38
A simple two-question query determined a group’s status. First, was the
group a minority population or were they Han?39 Second, if they were not
Han, were they independent or a subsidiary of a larger group?40 Gradually,
this inquiry resulted in the formation of the presently recognized fifty-six

31. See Wang Linzhu, supra note 14, at 6.
32. See id. at 5.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 7 (quoting JOSEPH STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 60 (Bruce
Franklin ed., Croom Helm London 1973)).
38. Wang Linzhu, supra note 14, at 7.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id.
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minzu, the Han are included in that fifty-six.41 Whether you’re identified as
a Han or a member of a minority minzu determines whether an individual
has the ability to claim the minority rights guaranteed under the Chinese
Constitution.42
The history between the Han and the minority races is convoluted and
complex, but consistently marked by Han feelings of superiority and a
desire by the ruling government for the minorities either to stay out of
China or, more recently, to cooperate for its betterment. During the
Dynastic Period, minorities were often generalized as barbarians. During
the Republican Period, minorities were urged to embrace their intrinsic
Chinese characteristics, and during the Communist Period minorities were
identified, registered, and instructed to work together for the advancement
of the socialist state.43 Because the definition proposed by Counsellor Yao
in his comments on the anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations’
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples tying indigenous people to
colonial history—and drawing a distinction between indigenous peoples
and native peoples—the People’s Republic has been able to simultaneously
embrace documents like the Declaration, while also treating their own
indigenous populations as they wish. Too, that treatment can be quite
severe.
For instance, the hostile actions of the People’s Republic toward
indigenous populations in Tibet are widely known of in the United States.
Tibet is a province of China located in the rugged terrain of the Himalayan
Mountains.44 Tibetans are a distinct ethnic group from the Han.45 Tibet was
annexed into the People’s Republic of China in 1950 following a Chinese
invasion of the then-independent nation.46 The conflict ended with a treaty
recognizing Chinese governance in Tibet known as the Seventeen Point

41. See id. at 9 (“By 1954 . . . thirty-eight groups received official recognition. . . . [I]n
the 1964 census . . . another fifteen minorities [were added to] the so-called ‘family of
nationalities.’”) The process was eventually completed in the 1980s.
42. Id. at 13.
43. See the lyrics to the popular patriotic song Love My China, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com (search in search bar for “Love My China” and “lyrics”; then scroll
down to click “Translate to English” button) (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (“Fifty-six
constellations, fifty-six flowers, fifty-six brothers and sisters are a family”).
44. Matthew Wills, Tibet and China 65 Years Later, JSTOR DAILY (May 23, 2016),
https://daily.jstor.org/tibet-and-china-65-years-later/. Tibet is either an “Autonomous
Region” or a subjugated nation, depending on the political leanings of the claimant.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.47 Today, many Tibetans
feel as though the Han are constricting their autonomy and threatening their
cultural integrity.48 The Tibetans oppose Beijing’s policies in various ways,
with perhaps the most famous and most extreme being self-immolation—
with over one hundred acts occurring between 2009 and 2016.49
The United States is familiar with the situation in Tibet. In 2008, as the
Olympic Torch crossed the world on its way to Beijing for the Summer
Games, the route through San Francisco was changed without warning to
avoid protests against Chinese treatment of Tibet and Tibetans.50 As it turns
out, the city was wise to avoid the area; shouting matches erupted between
pro-Beijing and pro-Tibet protestors shouting “Go China, Go China” to
which the response “Free Tibet, China Out,” was returned.51
The widely documented disputes between the native Tibetan population
and the government in Beijing is but a single instance of a larger problem—
the potential for conflict between the Han and the various minority minzu.
This is not altogether a new concern; indeed “[t]he dissolution of the
USSR . . . sounded a warning to communist China [who sought] to avoid
further demands for ethnic identification or alteration, which might cause
unrest.”52 While the situation in Tibet is quite well known, the conflicts
between the People’s Republic and its minority population is best illustrated
today in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
Who Are the Uighurs
The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, or Xinjiang, is a province in
China’s northwest-most area, bordering Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.53 Xinjiang is
a large province that “is a vital component of China’s political and

47. Id.
48. See Edward Wong, Tibetans Fight to Salvage Fading Culture in China, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/world/asia/china-tibet-languageeducation.html.
49. Wills, supra note 44.
50. Maggie Shiels, ‘Houdini Torch’ Relay Disappoints, BBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7339923.stm.
51. Id.
52. Wang Linzhu, supra note 14, at 11.
53. Matthew Moneyhon, Recent Developments, Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on
China’s “New Frontier”, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 120, 120–21 (2002), http://blog.
hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_03.1_moneyhon.pdf.
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economic stability.”54 Xinjiang has a long history of economic importance
in China. At one time, the desert region’s many oases provided the
lifeblood of the ancient Silk Road; today, the province’s location at the
crossroads of Central Asia and its status as a gateway into what will soon be
the world’s largest economy ensure it is a potentially valuable trade
corridor.55 Xinjiang is also valuable in itself because it “contains huge coal
and oil reserves, believed to be three times those of the United States.” 56
For these reasons, Xinjiang is a vital territory to the huge and resourcehungry Chinese economy. Xinjiang is also home to the Uighurs, one of the
fifty-five recognized minority minzu.57 The Uighurs are a Turkic people
native to the area and have been empowered by the central government in
Beijing to create a supposedly autonomous region.58 However, the actual
autonomy of the province, whose name literally translates to New Frontier,
may be less than what many Uighurs would like.59
The Uighurs and the Han are closer to old adversaries than they are old
friends. This is due largely to the historic pursuit by various incarnations of
the Chinese to sinicize foreign territories and peoples.60 Historic efforts of
sinicization began with the once progressive notion that all races had the
ability to civilize if only they adopted the culture of a civilized people—
specifically, for instance, the Han in China. The Uighurs’ proximity to Han
power centers ensured they were historically familiar with the Han
sinicization efforts. For example, in the 600s, Uighur leaders in Xinjiang
sent representatives to the Emperor of the Sui Dynasty to ask for protection
from a neighboring state.61 The Uighur state had collapsed shortly before
this time, and the area was ripe for conquest—both by their neighbors and
by the more distant Sui.62 The Emperor considered the request very
seriously because he was eager to expand the Sui; however, he also felt that
permitting the “barbarians” into the Chinese polity would weaken the state
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 123–24.
Pamela Kyle Crossley, Thinking About Ethnicity in Early Modern China, LATE
IMPERIAL CHINA, June 1990, at 1, 2. Here, sinicize means to make Chinese in character or
form; it is the Chinese equivalent to the term Americanize.
61. Shao-yun Yang, Reinventing the Barbarian: Rhetorical and Philosophical Uses of
the Yi-Di in Mid-Imperial China, 600–1300, at 45 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author).
62. Id.
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both militarily and culturally.63 The Emperor concluded that the Uighurs
would be loyal to the Sui Dynasty if the dynasty protected them from their
neighbors, saying “[w]e have relieved their poverty and provided them with
sustenance when they were weak. Their gratitude will surely have gone as
deep as the marrow of their bones.”64 This understanding demonstrates that
the historic policy of sinicization was believed to first take hold in a
barbarian culture by affording the barbarians economic advantages and
incentives. Such a paternalistic approach was commonplace at the time, and
it was common knowledge that “[b]arbarians, too, are human beings. If they
are governed with moral power, they can become like members of the
family.”65
Despite the Emperor’s hopes, the Uighurs did not respond to his moral
power. Within a decade of his decision to protect them from their
neighbors, the Uighurs raided Chinese frontier settlements.66 The Emperor
was displeased with his revelation, and he said that “[t]he barbarians are
faithless . . . . After making a covenant with us, they suddenly brought an
army to trample on our frontier territory. We can take advantage of this
opportunity to rebuke them for breaking the [previous] agreement . . . .”67
Even here, the intimate relationship between paternalism and sinicization is
illustrated as the Emperor rebuked the Uighurs as disobedient children—
rather than confronting them as an invading rival state.
Eventually, the conflict wore down even the basic assumptions that
civilization was cultural and not racial, with one of the Emperor’s advisors
lamenting that the Uighur barbarians “have no regard for gratitude—that is
their inborn nature.”68 While the statement suggests that the Sui eventually
determined that civilization was innate, rather than acquired, it is still true
that it was important to the Chinese state to discuss “civilization” as a trait
which could be learned. This idea, that even barbarians could be civilized

63. Id.
64. Id. at 48.
65. Id. Here, “moral power” refers to the innate authority the ancient Chinese believed
was possessed by Emperors so long as they maintained the Mandate of Heaven, a complex
notion that does not need to be discussed extensively here. Suffice to say that “moral power”
comes not only from governing justly, but also by upholding traditional cultural practices
and partaking in many culturally significant religious and social ceremonies native to Han
conceptualization. Therefore, the phrase “moral power” itself betrays some preference
toward Han peoples.
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id. at 59.
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through cultural assimilation has been rhetorically central to the interactions
between the Han and minorities for centuries.
While the Chinese state has enjoyed substantial control over Xinjiang
since the Han Dynasty (202 BC–220 AD), the first dynasty to make a
significant effort to integrate the region was the Great Qing.69 It was the
storied Emperor Qian Long (1711–1799) who formally incorporated the
region into the territorial boundaries of the Chinese state and first employed
the existing political structures in efforts to govern the region.70 This
consolidation was met with various uprisings against the Chinese,
perpetrated mostly by Uighur Muslims waging holy wars against the
foreign infidels.71 Despite Qian Long’s efforts, these rebellions, combined
with the lack of political will by his successors, ensured that the region was
never fully incorporated into the Chinese state. Even today, there is a clear
distinction between Xinjiang and much of the rest of China.72 This cultural
separation was exasperated after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and
the ensuing period of civil war and Japanese invasion. This invasion so
severely weakened the Chinese hold on Xinjiang that, in 1944, during the
height of the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist and Communist
parties, Xinjiang declared independence and the founding of the East
Turkestan Republic.73 This Republic was rooted in ethnic nationalism and
religious fervor but was ultimately short-lived.74 In 1949, shortly after their
victory in the Civil War, the soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army
marched into Xinjiang and put an end both to the Republic and to any
dreams of independence.75
Initially, Beijing offered these conquered Uighurs promises of autonomy
and self-determination (an ironic promise to a region it just invaded) in
hopes that independent minority republics would voluntarily join with the
People’s Republic in pursuit of strength in unity.76 However, due to the
machinations of the Soviet Union, Mongolia secured independence, which
the People’s Republic was forced to recognize, after securing victory in the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Moneyhon, supra note 53, at 125.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 130.
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Civil War.77 This was part of the broader conflicts in the Sino-Soviet
relationship, which scholars attribute to Stalin’s hesitance to fully embrace
the People’s Republic because he feared he could not effectively dominate
Mao.78 Mao feared that this relationship would lead Stalin to sever parts of
what had formed the Great Qing Dynasty from the People’s Republic so
that the Soviet Union could more effectively dominate the smaller states. 79
In response, Mao declared that Beijing’s policy toward the Uighurs and the
other recognized minorities would change—the minority communities
would be able to retain their language and culture, as well as continue to
control their own affairs so long as they did not seek to undermine the
territorial integrity of the People’s Republic.80 In effect, the policy shifted
from self-determination to the prioritization of the unity of the Chinese
state.
Despite Mao’s assurances, major changes were destined to come to
Xinjiang in the early Communist Period. Shortly after Mao’s change of
policy, the People’s Republic moved to end the area’s practice of Sharia
Law and to “disassemble the Islamic court system,” which was one that
both the Great Qing and the Nationalist had intentionally left undisturbed.81
The People’s Republic also brought the promised socialist land reform to
Xinjiang, upending centuries of feudal tradition. Land that had been
traditionally reserved for ownership and management by the region’s
religious institutions was incorporated into these programs and redistributed
to peasants; this cut deeply into the revenue of mosques and religious
workers who were then forced to rely on charity to continue their work. 82
Additionally, the amount of “cultivated land area nearly doubled between
1955 and 1960” due to the efforts of government programs.83 While
Uighurs may have reasonably found the destruction of their traditional
courts to be offensive, and while the impoverishment of their religious
institutions was a genuine cause for concern, the Communist Party was not
entirely set on a course of cultural annihilation.
77. See Sergey Radchenko, The Truth About Mongolia’s Independence 70 Years Ago,
THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 22, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-truth-about-mongoliasindependence-70-years-ago/.
78. Frederick H. Hartmann, The Meaning and Implication of the Sino-Soviet Split,
NAVAL WAR C. REV., Nov. 1967, at 14, 21.
79. Moneyhon, supra note 53, at 131.
80. Id. at 132.
81. Rian Thum, Uyghurs in Modern China, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASIAN HISTORY 9 (David Ludden et al. eds., 2018).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 10–11.
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During this same period, the People’s Republic began to record and
transcribe Uighur music and dance rituals to ensure these customs would be
preserved.84 At the same time, Beijing devoted funds to the restoration of
various cultural heritage sites around the region and collected and recorded
Uighur folklore, while also working with the Uighurs to provide Latin
scripts for their language.85 Generally, Beijing has attempted to preserve
aspects of Uighur culture not considered threatening while undermining
aspects, such as their Islamic faith, which Beijing distrusts. In addition to
undercutting the religious courts and traditional funding schemes, the
People’s Republic, during Mao’s Cultural Revolution (a period of general
upheaval), targeted the Uighur’s Islamic faith was targeted with special
intensity. During the Cultural Revolution, religion was declared a cultural
vice in need of abandonment, and as a result, “Islamic practice [became]
almost impossible. Islamic schooling was gone; mosques were converted to
party offices; religious texts were confiscated or destroyed; and shrine
veneration could only be carried out in secret.”86
Many scholars have alleged this promise of self-government beneath the
umbrella of the Chinese state was the first insidious step toward returning to
a policy of sinicization and that “[b]y casting minority integration in
familial terms and by reneging on the promise of the right to secede, the
[Chinese Communist Party] paved the way for the creation of autonomous
minority regions.”87 These regions sought to pacify the potentially volatile
desires of the minority minzu “by sustaining their own customs, religion,
language, and limited self-government until the immigration of Han
Chinese slowly changes the makeup of the population.”88 This theory is not
without merit related to the historic development of Chinese rule in
Xinjiang as Han settlement in Xinjiang has proven a consistent focus of the
People’s Republic. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party annexed Xinjiang
in 1949. In 1953, Han residents made up 6.1% of the population, and by
1964, the Han made up 32.9%.89 Not only were Han flooding into Xinjiang,
but as they arrived, the native resident Uighurs and Kazakhs migrated to the
Soviet Union and Afghanistan in large numbers.90

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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Id. at 10.
Moneyhon, supra note 53, at 33.
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Resistance to these changes originated in the Maoist Era (1949–1976),
but the first noteworthy efforts to resist the incoming Han and to undermine
the gradual assimilation efforts of the Han came in the Deng Era (1978–
1989); this came after the death of Mao and the opening up of the People’s
Republic under Deng.91 This resistance encouraged Uighurs to rediscover
their cultural heritage and exploit the new legal and financial framework
implemented by Deng. These economic reforms led to wealthier
communities; Xinjiang’s GDP skyrocketed, gaining 139% under Deng.92
The period also saw local scholars reading, appreciating, and repopularizing the works preserved by the earlier efforts of the Communist
Party, along with new works produced by Uighurs in the Soviet Union.93
Additionally, the Uighurs migrated back toward their religious roots, and in
the first decade of the Deng Era, they built thousands of new mosques,
returned to an Arabic alphabet, reestablished religious educational
institutions, and were left free to practice their faith, though not as publicly
as during the Republican Period.94 During this era, the promise made by
Mao—minimal involvement in cultural affairs at the cost of the ability to
secede—seemed mostly realized. However, this cultural rebirth was not
destined to last as shifting desires in Xinjiang and new fears in Beijing
combined to bring an end to the flourishing period.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the People’s Republic experienced a
spirit of protest across the nation, perhaps brought on by Deng’s reforms in
economics and politics. Xinjiang was not immune to this sweeping spirit,
most infamously illustrated by the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989.95 In
the 1980s, protests became more common as the government’s presence
was lessened. This relaxed government presence resulted in new protests,

91. Deng Xiaoping led a period of economic and political reform, loosening the
Communist Party’s control over the daily lives of its citizens. See Kjeld Erik BrØdsgaard,
Economic and Political Reform in Post-Mao China, 1 COPENHAGEN PAPERS E. & SE. ASIAN
STUD. 31, 41 (1987) (“Deng identified five major obstacles to political reform and
democratization: bureaucracy, overconcentration of power, patriarchal methods, lifelong
tenure of leading posts, and various kinds of privileges. In order to combat these phenomena
and introduce reforms in the political sphere it was necessary to ‘fully practice people's
democracy; ensure that all people truly enjoy the right to manage, through various effective
forms, state affairs and particularly local state power at the grass-roots level and the various
enterprises and institutions.’”) (quoting Deng Xiaoping).
92. Thum, supra note 81, at 12.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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which occasionally resulted in violence.96 It was also during this period that
Uighurs, in small but organized numbers, began to call for greater
autonomy and independence in the formation of a new Islamic State.97 In
1990, Uighurs assembled in the village of Baren and “chanted Islamic
slogans and later attacked police with firearms and homemade bombs.” 98
This was in the wake of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, which
devolved into the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Deng Xiaoping had already
demonstrated that political liberation should only be tolerated to a point. In
many ways, Deng’s philosophy, therefore, did not represent an actual
change from Mao’s, but, instead, moved the limits of tolerability. Those
who threatened the integrity, sovereignty, and security of the state were still
subject to extreme, violent repression in the Deng Era. Beijing’s concerns
were only heightened and vindicated in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, their model for minority autonomous regions.99 Following
the Tiananmen Square Protests, combined with the other protests ongoing
across the People’s Republic and abroad, the Communist Party concluded
that the “religious revival [in Xinjiang] threatened Chinese Communist
Party control of Xinjiang.”100 This determination proved determinative for
future relations between Beijing and Xinjiang.
After the Baren protests, the Communist Party responded with sanctions
directly aimed at the resurgent religious institutions. The construction of
new mosques was halted or slowed, and the religious education that had
begun to flourish was curtailed.101 The efforts to end these new social
movements resulted in the Uighurs being all the more determined to pursue
them. The Uighurs continued to reincorporate their traditional culture,
especially secular aspects, into their daily lives.102 Additionally, the Uighurs
imported foreign ideas of Islamic piety and generally became more
religious in the wake of the People’s Republic’s efforts.103 Conflict became
inevitable as Beijing attempted to hasten the Uighur assimilation and the
Uighurs attempted to distance themselves from the Han dominated
Communist Party. Throughout the 1990s, the protests that had been
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ongoing since the mid to late 1980s were suddenly coupled with regular
“riots, bombings and assassinations.”104
By the early 2000s, the People’s Republic was facing a significant
problem. A little known Muslim minority existing in the energy-rich
periphery of the Chinese state was resorting to extremist efforts to
accomplish its separatist ideas and pursue its own political agenda with
violence, often directed against the Han civilian population in the region.
On September 11, 2001, Muslim hijackers associated with Al Qaeda
attacked the United States in the largest and most costly terrorist attack in
American history. In response, President George W. Bush declared, “A
great people has been moved to defend a great nation. . . . Our military is
powerful, and it’s prepared. . . . America and our friends and allies join with
all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together
to win the war against terrorism.”105 The People’s Republic positioned itself
among America’s friends and aligned with the United States on the issue of
fighting terrorism. This alliance resulted in the People’s Republic taking an
aggressive new role in Xinjiang and framing their actions to force the
Uighur population into submission as part of an international war against
terrorism.106
Presently, most violence in Xinjiang is either unorganized or loosely
organized at best, and it typically takes the form of attacks against state
representatives, party officers, and police stations due to grievances, which
are ultimately local concerns.107 However, the less frequent—but more
organized—attacks are widely known. In 2014, Uighur separatists attacked
the Kunming train station with knives, resulting in the deaths of thirty-one
civilians and four Uighur attackers.108 This onslaught garnered national and
international attention and condemnation.109 The People’s Republic’s
response to this period of violence has focused on increasing the presence
of security forces in the region and the amount of Han in the area.

104. Id.
105. Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT
GEORGE W. BUSH (Sept. 11, 2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.
106. Jacques deLisle, 9/11 and U.S.-China Relations, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (Sept. 3,
2011), https://www.fpri.org/article/2011/09/911-and-u-s-china-relations/.
107. Thum, supra note 81, at 14.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Beijing has admitted that since 1999, their goal has been “to adjust the
proportions of the populations of different ethnic groups in Xinjiang.” 110
Today, the Han make up approximately 40% of the total population of
Xinjiang.111 Additionally, economic development has increasingly
benefitted the new Han settlers, rather than the indigenous Uighurs. For
instance, Uighurs have been effectively pushed out of now Han-dominated
metropolitan areas, with 98% of Han in Xinjiang living in urban centers and
90% of Uighurs living in rural areas.112 Even so, the few Uighurs who still
reside in major cities are “confined to poor, ghetto-like communities . . . in
the shadow of new high-rise office buildings.”113 This introduces an urbanrural element to complicate the already tenuous cultural relationship. While
the Uighur have become more devout to their Muslim faith, the Han tend to
be secular, and neither group is generally able to speak the other’s
language.114 The increasing tension, coupled with the growing volume of
Han in the region, resulted in violent riots in the city of Urumqi in 2009.115
The Urumqi Riots began as peaceful protests before devolving into violent
riots where Uighurs killed Han settlers indiscriminately; the Han responded
in kind.116 In response, the People’s Armed Police entered the region and
established checkpoints and guard stations, while the city of Urumqi was
effectively shut down.117 The internet across Xinjiang no longer functioned,
and the Uighurs outside the city were forced to obtain travel passes to move
about the province.118
What Is Happening to the Uighurs
The People’s Republic has always framed government efforts as
“campaigns.” The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution are two
such campaigns. The most noteworthy campaign impacting Han-Uighur
relations in Xinjiang is the Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism, or the
Strike Hard Campaign.119 The Strike Hard Campaign focused on deploying
110. Dana Carver Boehm, China’s Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of Uighur
Separatist Violence, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 61, 85 (2009).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 86–87.
113. Id. at 86.
114. Id. at 87.
115. Thum, supra note 81, at 14.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Boehm, supra note 110, at 64.
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military or paramilitary forces to Xinjiang and “tightening restrictions on
cultural expression and religious practice.”120 Because of historical
tensions, this campaign has caused Uighurs to fear that the Communist
Party’s “ultimate goal is to overrun their homeland, outlaw their Muslim
faith, and erase their cultural distinctiveness altogether.”121 While the Strike
Hard Campaign initially began in the late 1990s as part of the response to
violent resistance in Xinjiang, it was reinvigorated in the wake of the
September 11 attacks, and it is the foundation of Communist Party actions
in the region today.122
The Strike Hard Campaign is an aggressive assault on Uighur cultural
heritage. Local authorities acting under the guidance of the Campaign have
taken to “burning Uighur historical literature, imprisoning Uighur authors,
banning traditional music with Muslim references, and forbidding
instruction in the Uighur language at Xinjiang University.”123 This has been
justified as an effort to destroy literature promoting separatist ideas and to
punish the people who created it; however, the Campaign seems to interpret
everything acknowledging a separate Uighur identity as promoting
separatist ideas.124 Another key feature of the Strike Hard Campaign is to
disrupt the practice of illegal religious activities and to undermine the
extremist religious forces in the area.125 This practice has resulted in the
closure of illegal religious centers and the arrest of numerous individuals. 126
The state has also acted against those who translate the Quran into Uighur,
accusing them of preaching separatism.127
The People’s Republic has also made it more difficult for Uighur
Muslims to live out their faith. For instance, as part of the Campaign,
fasting was outlawed in schools and government offices, and students were
instructed to break their fasts.128 The Campaign also targeted the heart of
the religion by mandating that all imams must attend compulsory political
education classes to provide them with “a clearer understanding of the
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party’s ethnic and religious policies.”129 This notion extends naturally from
another Campaign push that prohibited worship outside of governmentsanctioned mosques, which were operated by government-approved
organizations and staffed by government-recognized imams.130 Further,
these imams were not permitted to criticize government policies.131 While
many Uighurs do accept these institutions as a part of life, many others
reject them for not being truly representative of the faith.132 Ironically, the
atheist Communist Party rejects alternatives as not only illegal, but also
heretical institutions.133 The Campaign has called on Uighur Party members
to reject Islam even more fiercely than the general public.
There is no distinction in the People’s Republic between the government
and the party, and the few Uighurs in government or in the Communist
Party are forbidden from attending religious festivals or ceremonies without
first seeking permission from their supervisors, followed by a subsequent
report.134 This requirement is a safeguard in addition to the structural
systems designed to keep the religious from holding membership in the
party. As the Communist Party is officially atheist, it is impossible to join
the party and adhere to any religion, including Islam. 135 This notion has
been enforced by consistently removing Muslims who have found their way
into the party from membership.136 Party membership is a significant
advantage in the People’s Republic; not only does it enable one to work for
the massive state infrastructure in more lucrative positions, but it also
unlocks many social advantages. However, Uighurs are effectively
forbidden from enjoying any of these benefits unless they forsake their
faith, something many are unwilling to do. These harsh policies have
encouraged Uighurs to immigrate abroad—many to Afghanistan—in an
effort to practice their faith, where they then become involved in militant
Islam and later bring those attitudes back to Xinjiang.137
In 2018, the Communist Party resolved to advance the “cultural
protection and development” of Xinjiang and to end the long simmering
129. Id. (quoting AMNESTY INT’L, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: CHINA’S ANTITERRORISM LEGISLATION AND REPRESSION IN THE XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION
16 (Mar. 2002)).
130. Id. at 97.
131. Id. at 97–98.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 97.
134. Id. at 95.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 96.
137. Id. at 100.
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conflict with decisive action.138 In a November 2018 whitepaper published
by the People’s Republic State Council Information Office, the party noted
that it had “worked to modernize ethnic cultures,” and that it had always
“respected [the Uighur’s] freedom of religious belief.”139 This benevolence,
the party clarified, was rooted in the maxim that the ethnic cultures of
minority minzu “make up an inseparable part of the Chinese culture.”140
However, the Party stated that this does not mean that the Uighurs are free
to practice their culture, especially their faith, without interference. Indeed,
“[a]dapting to local society is essential for the survival and development of
any religion . . . . Religious circles in Xinjiang are encouraged to promote
social harmony and development as well as cultural progress . . . .”141 This
promotion is executed by searching for principals and tenants in a particular
faith—Islam, for instance—who can “contribute to China’s development
and conform to China’s traditions.”142
In a self-described attempt to protect the valuable cultural heritage of
Xinjiang, the Communist Party has forced over a million ethnic Uighurs
into camps for reeducation.143 The policy behind this seems to be that
Uighurs are entitled to cultural protection, which extremism endangers;
thus, the party has imprisoned an estimated 11.5% of the Muslim
population of Xinjiang between the ages of twenty and seventy-nine.144
Initially, the party denied the existence of these facilities, but as evidence
continued to mount, they conceded and admitted that they had opened a
number of “vocational training centers” where “trainees” learn job skills
and lead “colorful lives.”145 In the few instances where China has offered
looks inside these camps, they show Uighurs who have renounced their

138. ST. COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CULTURAL
PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN XINJIANG (2018).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Editorial Bd., China Is Creating Concentration Camps In Xinjiang. Here’s How We
Hold It Accountable, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/china-is-creating-concentration-camps-in-xinjiang-heres-how-we-hold-itaccountable/2018/11/23/93dd8c34-e9d6-11e8-bbdb-72fdbf9d4fed_story.html.
144. Id.
145. Nectar Gan, Xinjiang Uygurs: China Boasts of Its Protection and Support for
Cultures in White Paper, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.scmp.
com/news/china/politics/article/2173484/xinjiang-uygurs-china-boasts-its-protection-andsupport-cultures.
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faith and now are working in the camps as factory workers.146 The party is
proud to provide jobs for these detained people, as it seeks to forge the
Uighurs into “a disciplined, Chinese-speaking industrial work force, loyal
to the Communist Party,” according to officials.147 The same officials also
outlined in reports that the camps would produce clothing that would then
be sold in stores across the People’s Republic and that inmates may be
expected to continue working at these facilities even after they are released
from the camps.148
These camps seem to be part of the tradition of the old re-education
through labor camps that were popular during the Cultural Revolution;
these camps saw intellectuals and the socially and politically elite who were
forced to move to the countryside to farm with the peasants so they could
better understand Mao Zedong Thought.149 In an interview, the Governor of
Xinjiang stated that “[t]he purpose of [the camps] is to fundamentally
eliminate the environment and soil that breeds terrorism and religious
extremism and eliminate the terrorism activities before they take place.” 150
Detainees are required to learn Mandarin and are also instructed “to accept
modern science and enhance their understanding of Chinese history and
culture.”151 Presumably, this includes understanding how Uighur culture
properly fits into the grander framework of Chinese culture. The governor
also marshalled graduates from these facilities to offer their insights. One
woman said that “[t]he government didn’t give up on me. It has actively
saved and assisted me, giving me free food, accommodation and education.
I will cherish this opportunity and become a person useful to the country
and society.”152 Additionally, the governor insisted that those who
underwent the educational training purged themselves of “extremist
thought” through activities such as art and sports and left the facilities with
“notably enhanced national consciousness.”153
146. Chris Buckley & Austin Ramzy, China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to
Forced Labor, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/
asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uighurs.html.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Lily Kuo, Internment Camps Make Uighurs’ Life More Colourful, Says Xinjiang
Governor, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2018, 3:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
oct/16/internment-camps-make-uighurs-life-more-colourful-says-xinjiang-governor.
151. Id.
152. Xinjiang Official Defends ‘Education Centers’ for Uighur Muslims, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 16. 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45872356.
153. Id.
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Interviews with Uighurs who no longer live in China have painted a
starkly different picture. According to Uighurs, even small actions can
result in a sentence at one of these camps. Suspicious behaviors include
having a beard, abstaining from alcohol or cigarettes, grieving publicly
when one’s parents die, refusing to attend public struggle sessions,154
refusing to denounce yourself or members of your family at said sessions,
owning a compass, complaining about local officials, or knowing or being
related to someone who has done any of the suspicious activities.155 Once
imprisoned, the experience can become brutal. One inmate described being
restrained to a chair so that he was immobilized, prevented from sleeping,
beaten with batons, and stabbed with needles.156 The inmate also described
being forced to share a room with forty-five other detainees and said there
was so little room they were forced to sleep in shifts.157 Other eyewitnesses
say that detainees are forced to sing propaganda songs, and if they refuse,
they are not fed.158 Others report being interrogated for extensive periods,
as long as three days, prior to being sent to the facilities.159 Inmates are
expected to condemn the three evil forces of separatism, extremism, and
terrorism, and “if you couldn’t recite [songs and slogans, the guards]
wouldn’t allow you to eat, sleep, or sit.”160 Additionally, inmates were often

154. Struggle sessions are a uniquely Chinese phenomenon closely associated with the
Chinese Cultural Revolution. See Massoud Hayoun, Photos: Fathers of Chinese Leaders at
Revolutionary ‘Struggle Sessions,’ ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2012/03/photos-fathers-of-chinese-leaders-at-revolutionarystruggle-sessions/254870/ (“In such sessions, everyone from politicians to teachers would be
dragged before a large audience and forced to humiliate themselves with withering selfcriticism, denunciations of their friends and allies, and pleas for forgiveness.”).
155. Tanner Greer, 48 Ways to Get Sent to a Chinese Concentration Camp: Something
Terrible Is Happening in Xinjiang, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 13, 2018, 10:40 AM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/13/48-ways-to-get-sent-to-a-chinese-concentration-camp/.
156. Alexandra Ma, What It’s Like Inside the Internment Camps China Uses to Oppress
Its Muslim Minority, According to People Who’ve Been There, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2018,
8:23 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/life-inside-china-internment-camps-for-uighurminority-in-xinjiang-bbc-report-2018-8.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Simon Denyer, Former Inmates of China’s Muslim ‘Reeducation’ Camps Tell of
Brainwashing, Torture, WASH. POST (May 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-ofbrainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aaef3c_story.html.
160. Id.
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fed pork and forced to drink alcohol if they were suspected of being
religious extremists.161
The plight of the Uighurs may cause one to reasonably wonder whether
the Communist Party has actually moved away at all from their ancient
strategies employed by the dynasties against “foreign barbarians.” Recall
the Sui Dynasty Emperor considering whether or not to admit the Uighurs
into the protection of the Dynasty. He and his court were confident that if
they extended economic wealth to the Uighurs, then they would repay the
Han with immense loyalty. When loyalty failed to manifest, he then
rebuked the Uighurs. He even questioned whether the entire project was
unnecessary as perhaps treachery was the Uighurs’ inborn nature.
There are substantial parallels between that story and the present
challenges faced by the Uighurs. The Communist Party moved into
Xinjiang initially with hopes that the Uighurs would join them voluntarily
in the socialist struggle. To encourage loyalty to the state, the Communist
Party invested heavily in the region, and the economy has improved
substantially under the administration of the People’s Republic (though
perhaps not as fast as the Han-dominated coastal regions). However, the
Communist Party, much like the Sui Emperor, was rebuffed and the loyalty,
or willing assimilation, they anticipated did not materialize. Instead, both
the Communist Party and the Sui Emperor felt attacked for their generosity.
The party, as well as the Emperor, resolved to rebuke the Uighurs, and
while the Emperor did so with military force, the party has done so with
large-scale incarceration and even more violently forced assimilation.
While there are certainly substantial divergences between the Communist
Party and the Sui Dynasty and their experiences, it is difficult to ignore the
somewhat cyclical nature of the present dispute in Xinjiang.
The ongoing actions of the People’s Republic toward the Uighurs are
cruel and unacceptable. However, when it comes to what can be done, we
may find that options are quite limited, especially domestically. The
People’s Republic claims to be a nation built on the rule of law; however,
their legal principals allow for a great deal to be done in the name of
preserving the integrity and sovereignty of the state. An examination of the
development of Chinese law affecting indigenous peoples demonstrates
how their historically robust protections have been consistently weakened
by the Communist Party’s rulership, creating the current situation in
Xinjiang.

161. Id.
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The Jiangxi Soviet
The origin of the Communist Party’s minority minzu laws trace their way
back to the Chinese Civil War, when the Communist Party was little more
than a band of guerrilla fighters attempting revolution. In 1927, the
Communist and Nationalist parties agreed to a momentary truce, setting
aside their ideological differences to come together as Chinese people and
resist the invasion of the Japanese Empire.162 However, this alliance was
not destined to last; during a brief lull in hostilities against Japan, the
Nationalists saw an opportunity to exterminate the Communists and ensure
their continued governance over China if the Japanese did not prevail in the
parallel conflict.163 Jiang Jieshi, leader of the Nationalist party, acted on this
opportunity and on April 12, 1927, ordered Nationalist troops to ambush
their unsuspecting communist allies.164 The Communists were attacked
across the nation, centering in Shanghai, and suffered immense casualties,
with as many as 5000 missing, many presumed dead.165 This betrayal
forced the Communist Party to evacuate from the urban centers, which were
controlled either by the Nationalist or the Japanese, and retreat into the
mountainous countryside as the Civil War resumed in earnest. The
Communist Party established a defensible position in the rural Jiangxi
Province and began to regroup there. It was during this period that the
Communist Party first turned its attention to the issue of indigenous
peoples’ rights.166
The Constitution of the Jiangxi Soviet was the first document the
Communist Party endorsed as a model of what government would look like
in a then-hypothetical People’s Republic of China.167 However, the
document was prepared during a time of conflict when the Communist and
Nationalist parties both offered competing ideas for what the future of the
Chinese state could and should be. For this reason, the Constitution was as
much as a platform as it was a legal document. The Communist Party hoped
that Constitution’s progressive nature would encourage people across the
162. Chang Liu, Making Revolution in Jiangnan: Communist and the Yangzi Delta
Countryside, 1927–1945, 29 MOD. CHINA 3, 5 (2003).
163. See Paul R. Gregory, Hsaio-ting Lin & Lisa Nguyen, Chiang Chooses His Enemies,
HOOVER DIGEST (Apr. 21, 2010), https://www.hoover.org/research/chiang-chooses-hisenemies.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Chang Liu, supra note 162, at 6.
167. See FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC (Martin Lawrence Ltd.,
1934).
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country to rally to their cause. Specifically, the Communist Party was aware
that the Nationalist’s grasp on the periphery of the country—including
Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang—as especially tenuous. Therefore, if the
Communist Party could earn the loyalty of these minority groups far from
the center, its numbers would not only be replenished but would, for the
first time, make significant territorial gains against the Nationalists. This
would pinch the Nationalists between the Communists in the west and the
Japanese coast. Mao, one of the leaders of the Jiangxi Soviet, was explicit
that his ambition was to attract the minorities of China to his cause by
offering them extensive rights under Communist rule.168
The Jiangxi Constitution provides “[t]he Soviet government of China
recognizes the right of self-determination of the national minorities in
China, their right to complete separation from China and the formation of
an independent state for each national minority.”169 This is a profound
promise. As has been established, both Xinjiang and Tibet presently have
noteworthy populations desiring freedom from the governance of the
People’s Republic, and both regions certainly could benefit from such
generous language. During the Jiangxi Soviet Era, the Communist Party
attempted to portray itself as the ultimate ally to minority groups across the
country, and promises of “complete separation” and “independent states”
were an excellent strategy for such an endeavor. Of course, today the
Communist Party considers separatism to be one of the “three evils”
Uighurs are forced to denounce, but this would not be so had the Jiangxi
Soviet been adopted into the People’s Republic, as the party initially said it
would be. The Jiangxi Constitution also stated the People’s Republic would
“encourage the development of national culture and of the respective
national languages of these peoples.”170 This statement is another ironic
promise given that, today, the use of the Uighur native language may be
grounds to send individuals to internment camps for reeducation and to
learn Mandarin. The promises enshrined in Article 14 make the Jiangxi
Constitution one of the most progressive documents ever drafted in the
realm of indigenous peoples’ rights, surpassing even the United Nations’
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Of course, it is easier to
make promises than to act on them.
The Jiangxi Soviet’s constitution endured even as the Communists fled
Jiangxi because of the advancing Nationalists. However, after World War
168. Moneyhon, supra note 53, at 130.
169. FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC, supra note 167, at 22.
170. Id.
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II, the Communists abandoned political philosophizing to resume full-scale
hostilities against the Nationalists. Eventually, the Communist Party
prevailed over its Nationalist foes and forced Jiang’s party to retreat to
Taiwan in 1949.171 In the same year, the Communist Party consolidated its
control over the state’s periphery.172 Still, the Jiangxi Soviet had not made
minority nations eager to submit to the Communist Party or join the
People’s Republic, even with the promise of eventual self-determination.
The People’s Republic brought both Tibet and Xinjiang into the state only
after invasion and conquest.173
The advent of the Communist Party brought with it benefits and
detriments to Xinjiang. While arable land was expanded and the economy
grew explosively in the early Maoist Period, there were also large influxes
of ethnic Han into the area.174 Today, the Uighurs make up only 45% of the
population, while the Han make up 40%—the effect of decades of
relocation policies.175 The Maoist Period also brought with it the Great
Leap Forward, the Korean War, and the Cultural Revolution, all of which
were disasters for the People’s Republic. Xinjiang was equally affected by
the resulting famines and mass starvation.176 While the Uighurs were not
necessarily fond of the Maoist Period, there do not seem to have been major
protests, though this may have been due to the tight control the government
had over the people. However, it does seem that during this period “the
Uighurs began to feel marginalized in their own land, and viewed the
increasing integration with China as a threat to their cultural survival.”177
These feelings would be vindicated following the response of the People’s
Republic to the Uighurs’ cultural renaissance in the Deng Period.
171. The Uighurs: A History of Persecution: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l
Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th
Cong. 19 (2009) (statement of Ms. Kara Miriam Abramson, Advocacy Director,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 23 (statement of Ms. Felice D. Gaer, Chair, U.S. Commission of International
Religious Freedom).
174. Id.
175. British Broad. Corp., Xinjiang Profile – Full Overview, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16913494.
176. This is a vast oversimplification of the Maoist Era; however, oversimplifications
are, to some extent, necessary in any paper of limited scope.
177. Natasha Parassram Concepcion, Human Rights Violations Against Muslims in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of Western China, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Fall 2000, at 19,
19, https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1474&context=hr
brief.
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Initially, even though the Jiangxi Soviet’s Constitution had not been
adopted by the People’s Republic and a new Constitution was still being
drafted, the Uighurs enjoyed some of the freedoms they were promised by
the old constitution. Prior to the Cultural Revolution’s efforts to purge
religion, the Uighurs were “entitled to practice their religion unhindered, for
it was part of their ‘national culture.’”178 While this freedom to practice was
limited, the Uighurs seemed generally satisfied with the arrangement.
Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution would soon sweep over the nation,
including in Xinjiang. During the Revolution, religious belief would be
declared a societal sickness in need of annihilation.179 The Uighurs,
therefore, experienced two great betrayals between the end of the Second
World War and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. The first came
when the People’s Republic abandoned its promise of self-determination
and invaded Xinjiang, forcibly annexing the region. The second came
during the Cultural Revolution, when the rights of the Uighurs to practice
their faith was rescinded. These two events demonstrate the fading
promises of Jiangxi and the coming reality of Communist Party rule in
Xinjiang.
The Jiangxi Soviet’s Constitution was an aspirational model the rest of
the world could look toward insofar as its promises to indigenous people;
however, the Communist Party rejected it shortly after taking control of
mainland China. Instead of modifying the Jiangxi Soviet so that it could
retain the spirit of many of its foundational principles, the Communist Party
resolved to build an entirely new Constitution for its entirely new country.
The new Constitution of the People’s Republic would extinguish the last
embers of the Jiangxi Soviet’s Constitution, replacing Jiangxi’s limitless
promises with contingent assurances that individuals’ rights would be
upheld so long as they do not too greatly interfere with assimilation. When
the Communist Party drafted the Jiangxi Constitution, they were focused on
winning a war, but when they drafted the People’s Republic’s Constitution,
they were focused on building a powerful, unified state.

178. C. P. FitzGerald, Notes and Comment, Religion and China’s Cultural Revolution,
40 PAC. AFFAIRS 124, 127 (1967).
179. See id. at 124 (noting that due to the Cultural Revolution “the policy of moderate
tolerance which had marked government treatment of the main religions in China is now at
an end”).
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Present Constitution
The People’s Republic of China’s Constitution is very long, comprised
of four chapters and 138 articles.180 While the American Constitution exists
mostly as a series of principles, which are ultimately somewhat vague and
in need of interpretation, the Constitution of the People’s Republic aims to
effectively answer almost any question that may be raised. In fact,
Americans may say that the Chinese Constitution is more akin to the United
States Code than to the United States Constitution.
In its earliest passages, the Chinese Constitution asserts “[t]he State
respects and protects human rights.”181 However, the Chinese Constitution
does not place the entirety of this responsibility on the state alone, but it
also admonishes the people to do their part for the safety of the state.
Specifically, the Constitution states that “[e]very citizen is entitled to the
rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the
Constitution and other laws.”182 The consequences of this are clear—the
Chinese people are entitled to human rights, or, at least, human rights as
defined by China. The Chinese Communist Party can therefore legally
shun, curtail, or limit rights either within the Constitution itself or through
supplementary legislation.
The government’s ability to limit the definition of human rights is
especially clear in the realm of religion. Citizens “enjoy the freedom of
religious belief” and may not be compelled “to believe in, or not to believe
in, any religion: nor may [the State] discriminate against citizens who
believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.”183 Yet, the State only
“protects normal religious activities,” and these are activities which do not
“disrupt the public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the
educational system of the State.”184 The Communist Party has interpreted
the “normal religious activities” clause to apply only to state-recognized
churches. For this reason, the Uighurs must worship at mosques approved
by the state, just as Christians must worship at either the state-sanctioned
Catholic or Protestant associations. Any worship outside these contexts falls
outside the normal religious practices constitutionally protected.

180. See History of Amendments to China’s Constitution, CGTN (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://news.cgtn.com/news/784d6a4d79677a6333566d54/share_p.html.
181. XIANFA art. 33, § 3 (1982) (China).
182. Id.
183. XIANFA art. 36, §§ 1, 2 (1982) (China).
184. XIANFA art. 36, § 3 (1982) (China).
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Additionally, religions in China are “not [to be] subject to any foreign
domination.”185 The result of this full article is to give Chinese citizens the
freedom of religion but only insofar as the State is prepared to tolerate it;
where there is a rational reason to believe that a particular religious
practice, or even religion, undermines one of the three government
interests, or alternatively where the religion is too heavily influenced by
foreigners, the State can and will crack down on its practice. In fact, the
Constitution later explicitly states, “Citizens of the People’s Republic of
China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the
interests of the State, of society or of the collective . . . .” 186 This sentence
clearly communicates what the other articles suggested implicitly—the
rights of the people are subservient to the rights of the State. Such a notion
provides a fundamental foundation for understanding how Chinese law
interprets human rights and how that interpretation will affect China’s
views on the rights of indigenous peoples.
The Chinese Constitution sharply departs from the language used by the
preceding Jiangxi Constitution on the matter of China’s nationalities. The
Jiangxi Constitution assured the nationalities that “[t]he Soviet government
of China recognizes the right of self-determination of the national
minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and the
formation of an independent state for each national minority.”187 The
Chinese Constitution, on the other hand, aggressively did away with any
promises of self-determination or the complete separation previously
guaranteed. In place of these promises, the Chinese Constitution declared
that “[i]t is the duty of the citizens of the People’s Republic of China to
safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its
nationalities.”188 The Uighurs, like all other nationalities in China, went
from having the guarantee of self-determination and, if desired,
independence under the old Jiangxi Constitution to suddenly having a duty
to advance and maintain their integration with the Chinese central state.

185. Id. Historically this “foreign domination” has been directed mostly toward the
Vatican; however, the Pope and the Chinese have recently reached an agreement which saw
the Pope formally acknowledge the legitimacy of bishops presiding over the previously
excommunicated Chinses Catholic Patriotic Association. See Nicole Winfield, Pope Urges
Chinese Catholics to Trust, Reconcile After Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/f1527472e44c4f9687bf5d4daa2ebfb3.
186. XIANFA art. 51 (1982) (China).
187. FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC, supra note 167, at 22.
188. XIANFA art. 52 (1982) (China) (emphasis added).
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The new Constitution recognized that indigenous populations may be
unwilling to trade self-determination for complete incorporation, and
therefore, offered an olive branch in the form of the autonomous regions.
They were assured that these regions would be led by representatives of the
same nationality as those governed and would “independently administer
educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in
their respective areas . . . .”189 So, the new Constitution seemed to suggest
that the local populations can still govern issues of local concern without
outside interference, but international relations and economic decisions
would still be made in conjunction with the interests of the State.190 Further,
local regions were free to “employ the spoken and written language or
languages in common use in the locality.”191 While this may initially sound
like a fair, even if unsatisfying arrangement, the Constitution becomes
significantly less friendly toward the rights of minorities in the last article
of the section, and it does so quietly. It notes that one of the obligations of
the State is to provide “financial, material, and technical assistance to the
minority nationalities to help accelerate their economic and cultural
development.”192 This is the supreme law of the land in China and therefore
acts as a suitable frame for discussion about how the law in mainland China
has evolved and what this evolution means for the rights of indigenous
peoples.
Recent Legal Changes
When the existence of the vast internment camps first became widely
known to the global public, the People’s Republic denied their existence.193
However, the evidence of the camps’ existence continued to accumulate
and eventually forced Beijing to acknowledge their existence. After their
acknowledgement, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region moved to
189. XIANFA art. 119 (1982) (China).
190. The autonomous regions were also empowered to collect their own taxes and handle
much of their own finances. XIANFA art. 117 (1982) (China). However, this is not necessarily
cause to celebrate as it is common in China for localities or provinces to be given the power
to tax which will enable the central government to contribute less substantially to those same
regions—this leads to wealth for wealthy regions and stagnant poverty for those less
fortunate areas.
191. XIANFA art. 121 (1982) (China).
192. XIANFA art. 122, § 1 (1982) (China) (emphasis added).
193. Lily Kuo, From Denial to Pride: How China Changed Its Language on Xinjiang’s
Camps, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/fromdenial-to-pride-how-china-changed-its-language-on-xinjiangs-camps.
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enact legislation legitimizing the camps. Xinjiang had previously possessed
legislation outlining how the government could respond to terrorism as a
result of the Strike Hard Campaign; nonetheless, in the wake of
international outcry against the camps, they amended the regulation to
acknowledge and endorse the camps. The revisions state that
“[g]overnments at the county level and above can set up education and
transformation organizations and supervising departments such as
vocational training centers, to educate and transform people who have been
influenced by extremism.”194 This revision was designed to address
specifically the complaints that the People’s Republic had been acting
without legal authorization. The previous version of the law had identified
numerous “manifestations of extremism” including many of things
characteristic of Uighurs, such as “having ‘abnormal beards,’ refusing to
watch television or listen to radio, and preventing children from receiving
national education.”195
Despite the changing law, many observers have rejected the legal
authorization and have asserted that “international human rights law is
clear, no matter how much China tries to ‘legalize’ the impermissible.”196
Others have gone even further, asserting that “[w]hat the Chinese
(government) is doing is illegal on every front: under international law,
under their own constitution, under criminal procedures, [and under]
autonomy law.”197 Others have pointed to China’s counter-terrorism law
which permits a maximum of fifteen days detention without charge, which
the camps have routinely exceeded.198
Still, an examination of these claims in light of the Constitution of the
People’s Republic will quickly demonstrate that these actions are legal
under Chinese law. Firstly, it is the duty of the People’s Republic to ensure
that separatism does not have room to grow in the country and that nothing
jeopardizes the unity of the various minzu. It is also clear that the rights of
the citizenry are subservient to these ends. The Constitution expressly states
194. Nectar Gan & Mimi Lau, China Changes Law to Recognise ‘Re-education Camps’
in Xinjiang, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 10, 2018, 5:15 PM), https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/politics/article/2167893/china-legalises-use-re-education-camps-religiousextremists.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Paul Eckert, Uyghurs, Legal Experts Dismiss Chinese Legal Move to Justify Reeducation Camps, RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/
uyghur/camps-law-10112018192530.html.
198. Id.
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that “[i]t is the duty of citizens of the People’s Republic of China to
safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its
nationalities.”199 This duty imposes an obligation on the citizens to advance
the principles of unity. The state has the obligation to “combat local
national chauvinism” and “do its utmost to promote the common prosperity
of all the nationalities.”200 This language empowers the state to determine
what policies must be pursued to promote the common prosperity of the
various minzu and then confer the obligation to pursue that policy to the
people. Likewise, the people do not have a right to practice religion freely
but only the ability to practice normal religions and only then when they do
not “disrupt public order,” which is another determination Beijing is
empowered to make.201 Citizens do enjoy freedom from arrest “except with
the approval or by decision of a people’s procuratorate or by decision of a
people’s court.”202 That said, procuratorates are themselves appointed at the
local level.203 For this reason, we can conclude that the legal change does
authorize the arrests and that the People’s Republic could reasonably draw
a distinction between arrest and detainment.
These conclusions are not surprising. The Constitution of the People’s
Republic places the authority of the state-the peoples’ democratic
dictatorship-in a position of paramount importance. The rights of the people
exist but are ultimately subservient to the state, and the state is tasked with
ensuring the territorial integrity of the People’s Republic almost above all
other things. Thus, it is only natural that the People’s Republic would have
the legal authority under Chinese law to erect these camps and wage this
war of cultural annihilation, especially because it is in the name of
mitigating separatist efforts.
International Response to Xinjiang
The international community has been surprisingly vocal about the
situation in Xinjiang; yet, these numerous complaints have not materialized
into any action. Alongside the standard outcry by international human
rights organizations, there have been several statements by prominent
politicians around the world criticizing Beijing for their policies in Xinjiang
and calling on the People’s Republic to bring their actions against the
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

XIANFA art. 52 (1982) (China).
XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (China)
XIANFA art. 36 (1982) (China).
XIANFA art. 37 (1982) (China).
XIANFA art. 101 (1982) (China).
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Uighurs there. In April 2018, Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Chris
Smith urged the American Ambassador to China, Terry Branstad, to call for
an investigation of Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang.204 This effort has not yet
materialized into any actual action. In May, when the People’s Republic
prevented President Dolkun Isa of the World Uyghur Congress, a
government-in-exile group calling for the independence of Xinjiang, from
speaking before a United Nations conference on indigenous peoples’ rights,
United States representative Kelley Currie complained that the Chinese
were unfairly keeping Mr. Isa from speaking.205 Mr. Isa was eventually
permitted into the United Nations building on his third attempt after being
escorted out twice previously at China’s urging.206
United States Vice President Mike Pence lamented the internment of the
Uighurs while speaking at a religious freedom conference in July of
2018.207 Still, the Vice President devoted only forty of the speech’s 3500
words to the issue of Xinjiang.208 Additionally, Muslim leaders around the
world have been even less engaged with the issue and “[n]o Muslim
nation’s head of state has made a public statement in support of the Uighurs
this decade.”209 Senator Marco Rubio, this time aided by sixteen other
Congressmen, attempted again in August to push the United States to take
action against China and calling for the United States to impose sanctions
against ranking Communist Party leaders in Xinjiang.210 This request was
not acted upon.
That the United States has not taken meaningful action against the
People’s Republic for their actions in Xinjiang should not be surprising.
Even if not for the fact that the United States is currently headed by an
204. .East Turkestan: US Senator Marco Rubio Calls for Investigation of Incarcerations
and Surveillance of Uyghurs, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (Apr. 6,
2018), https://unpo.org/article/20728.
205. Colum Lynch, U.S. Once Jailed Uighurs, Now Defends Them at U.N., FOREIGN
POLICY (May 25, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/u-s-once-jailed-uighurs-nowdefends-them-at-u-n/.
206. Id.
207. Remarks by Vice President Pence at Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-vice-president-pence-ministerial-advance-religious-freedom/.
208. Id.
209. Nithin Coca, Islamic Leaders Have Nothing to Say About China’s Internment
Camps for Muslims, FOREIGN POLICY (July 24, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/
islamic-leaders-have-nothing-to-say-about-chinas-internment-camps-for-muslims/.
210. Josh Chin & Eva Dou, American Lawmakers Push to Sanction Chinese Officials
over Xinjiang Camps, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
lawmakers-push-to-sanction-chinese-officials-over-xinjiang-camps-1535554800.
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administration not especially interested in conflict over human rights, the
United States would still be hesitant to engage the People’s Republic.211
Benito Mussolini is attributed with having said “[t]he League [of Nations]
is very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall
out.”212 He was conveying the idea that international agreements and
organizations are more adept at corralling and punishing smaller states than
they are at doing the same against great powers. This is an astute
observation. As was pointed out, Muslim nations’ heads of state have not
condemned China’s actions in Xinjiang, and this is because “[m]any
Muslim governments have strengthened their relationship with China or
even gone out of their way to support China’s persecution.”213 This is a
natural consequence of the People’s Republic potent economic might. It is
difficult to muster the political will to confront such a powerful state that
indisputably makes a more profitable friend than adversary.
The Role of Indigenous Peoples’ Law
Indigenous peoples’ law may not help the Uighurs. It is conceivable, if
not likely, that even should the world suddenly view the entire struggle of
the Uighur people through the lens of indigenous people law, that nothing
about China’s actions toward Xinjiang would change. There is no reason to
believe that they would do anything other than ignore the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Nevertheless, that does
not mean that there is no value in reconsidering who the world should
classify as indigenous and tearing down the distinctions between
indigenous and native peoples, as proposed by Counsellor Yao.
Counsellor Yao put forward, in his speech honoring the anniversary of
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that
there was a distinction between indigenous and native populations. He
contended that not all countries have indigenous peoples and that
indigenous peoples are uniquely tied to Western colonial history. Largely,
the world seems to agree with him, which is why the states that most
resisted the Declaration were those Western states with bloody colonial
pasts. Even so, there is no need for this distinction.
211. See generally Suzanne Nossel, It’s OK That Trump Doesn’t Care About Human
Rights: America Still Does, FOREIGN POLICY (June 19, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.
com/2017/06/19/its-ok-that-trump-doesnt-care-about-human-rights/.
212. Quoted in John Christian Bailey, Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: Discourses of
Europe in Germany 1939–1950, at 82 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University).
213. Coca, supra note 209.
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The Uighurs of Xinjiang are clearly an indigenous population by any fair
definition of the word. Further, the stereotypical indigenous peoples would
no doubt look at the current situation in Xinjiang-as Beijing attempts to
force out their religion, language, and culture, and seeks to forcibly
assimilate them into the cultural majority-and would not see painful
reminders of their own pasts. The cultural extermination ongoing in
Xinjiang and Tibet are of precisely the kind that efforts like the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was drafted to
address. Catastrophes are inevitable when a cultural minority is governed
by an unrestrained majority. We have seen this story before in the United
States. We will see it again elsewhere. And while it is true that it does not
matter how the world labels China’s actions in Xinjiang, there is no reason
that crimes against indigenous communities should sting more than crimes
against human rights; the mistake lays in focusing on what Mussolini would
call the eagles and not the sparrows.
The People’s Republic of China is a massive economy and an emerging
superpower, but they are unique in this role. The vast majority of
indigenous peoples, defined in a way that does not draw distinctions
between indigenous and native as Counsellor Yao does, are more akin to
sparrows than they are to eagles. The world believes there is value in
recognizing the specific rights and interests of indigenous communities—if
it did not there would be no need for specific declarations and organizations
concerning them—and the world should therefore not shy away from
applying the label “indigenous peoples” broadly. There is no reason that an
individual should hear the word indigenous and think more quickly of New
Zealand than Tibet. And there is no reason why expanding the world’s
understanding of indigenous peoples should necessarily harm the interests
and ambitions of those groups presently recognized as such. And perhaps
broadening the coalition of indigenous peoples could itself have intrinsic
benefits for those communities and humanity more broadly.
Conclusion
At present, there are approximately one million men and women being
unjustly held in internment camps in China’s far western region of
Xinjiang. This represents the cumulation of decades, or perhaps even
centuries, of assimilation-oriented policies by the Han toward minorities in
general and Uighurs specifically. The People’s Republic has relied on
creative interpretations of what groups constitute indigenous peoples to
sidestep the issue and assert that there are no indigenous people in the
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People’s Republic of China. This is an absurd claim given the vast ethnic
diversity the People’s Republic boasts of. While the People’s Republic is
likely protected from feeling actual consequences for their mass interment
policies due to their substantial power on the world stage, and thus there is
likely little that one can reasonably expect to be done for the Uighurs to
mitigate their present plight, there is value in using the Uighurs to better
understand that the struggles endured by indigenous and native populations
are substantially similar. It is possible that correcting our understanding of
the term could assist the world in confronting other states who, like China,
do have indigenous peoples not traditionally thought of as such, and who
are acting against them in ways rising to the level of cultural genocide. This
is itself sufficient cause to seek a realignment of our understanding of
indigenous people to a more inclusive standard.
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